[roosh]

This is a question about the nature of reality i.e. the state of things as they actually exist, and the validity of a materialist paradigm. This isn't a new idea, in fact, it could probably be classified as philosophy 101.


I find I learn a lot from discussion on here, and elsewhere, primarily because I am presented with different perspectives and my opinions are challenged; but equally because I am introduced to sources of information I wouldn't have come across previously; so this discussion [if it materialises] is as much about that as it is anything else. Still, like any discussion, it is probably necessary to have some starting position from which to proceed.


The proposition
That we* experience a physical world is not in question; it is pretty self-evident. I think it is also prudent to say that the scientific method is probably our best means of making models and predictions about the physical world.

I think it is also fair to say that the scientific method doesn't necessarily cast aspersions on the nature of reality; it deals with the physical world, without any assumption about whether or not the nature of reality is physical.


Science
Without making any assumptions about the nature of reality, if we simply follow the scientific method we deduce that the processes of the brain (physical matter) are what gives rise to our mental experiences.

We also deduce that what we experience as the physical world around us, including our own bodies, is a mental projection of sensory stimuli.

Side by side, these are two, seemingly, contradictory statements:

• matter gives rise to mind i.e. the mind is what the brain does

• the mind gives rise to matter i.e. matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection of sensory stimuli

Materialism
A materialist paradigm assumes that the nature of reality is physical and that matter gives rise to mind; however, from the above it would appear that such a position is self-refuting.

That matter gives rise to mind, appears to be circular, in that the conclusion has to be assumed.


Another perspective?
Is there another way of looking at the evidence below, which isn't self-refuting and doesn't require us to assume our conclusion?

• matter gives rise to mind

• matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection i.e. the mind gives rise to matter

[18AD]

Good question; lots to think about.

Does it actually posit that mind creates matter? I think that would be going too far. Certainly mind perceives matter, and experience gives rise to matter in a particular way. The perceptual way. But to say that it creates it is too far. Maybe?

The true materialist would say that there is no mind at all. There is ismply matter, and brains. Mind is just some illusory addition to matter.

-

You could go the phenomenological route and look to experience itself. In which case matter is a formal concept that arises out of a pre-predicative existence. That is, matter as a formal concept doesn't exist in our experience of the world.

The extreme view would be, does anything exist if no one is around to view it? I'm somewhat sympathetic to the negative answer. It also seems to be the ideal point of science, to find the view from nowhere, without subjectivity.

Just some preliminary thoughts.

[Joe1919]

There is an argument that although it cannot be proven that 'substance' exists, nevertheless, we have no choice (if we want to live) but to interact with the world in some way. i.e. There exists an 'animal faith' or 'animal spirit' that is stronger than reason and is perhaps driven by feeling and intuition. I will give you some quotes.

'I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. .....Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy.' (David Hume Treatise...)

'The hungry dog must believe that the bone before him is a substance, not an essence; and when he is snapping at it or gnawing it, that belief rises into conviction, and he would be a very dishonest dog if, at that moment, he denied it. For me, too, while I am alive, it would be dishonest to deny the belief in substance; and not merely dishonest, but foolish: because if I am observant, observation will bring me strong corroborative evidence for that belief.'(Santayana, Scepticism and animal faith)

Husserl states that Realism is the natural attitude to take towards the world. We are 'conscious of a world endless spread out over space. [...] Corporal physical things are simply there for me. ( Ideas Part 2). But we can also see the world from an ideal point of view and bracket out any idea of existence etc. (This was the philosophical view that he took in his later years).

PS Stating that Realism is the 'natual attitude' does not necessarly imply that it is the 'true' or indeed always the most useful, as for example, the case where it is the 'natural attitude' to consider that the sun goes around the stationary earth.

[18AD]

The natural attitude of naive realism is also that by which we assume objects exist in their own right. So the scientist is usually considered to be a naive realist as he uses all his instruments to make measurements of objects (that presumably exist).

[roosh]

Originally Posted by 18AD

Good question; lots to think about.

Does it actually posit that mind creates matter? I think that would be going too far. Certainly mind perceives matter, and experience gives rise to matter in a particular way. The perceptual way. But to say that it creates it is too far. Maybe?

The true materialist would say that there is no mind at all. There is ismply matter, and brains. Mind is just some illusory addition to matter.

-

You could go the phenomenological route and look to experience itself. In which case matter is a formal concept that arises out of a pre-predicative existence. That is, matter as a formal concept doesn't exist in our experience of the world.

The extreme view would be, does anything exist if no one is around to view it? I'm somewhat sympathetic to the negative answer. It also seems to be the ideal point of science, to find the view from nowhere, without subjectivity.

Just some preliminary thoughts.

You might be right, it might perhaps be a little too far.

I think what can be said though, is that all matter, or at least our perception of it [which is all we know about matter] is a projection. That is, if there is a world "out there" then what we experience of it is a projection. But if we say that matter gives rise to the experience of what we label "mind" i.e. the projection of matter, we get caught in somewhat of a loop:

Matter causes the projection of matter, but the matter that causes that projection is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection and so on ad infinitum.

To get out of that loop you could assume that matter causes the projection, but I think that is to assume your conclusion. Alternatively, if mind does exist, and mind causes matter or rather, matter is just a perception of the mind, then there is no recurring loop. That matter appears to give rise to the projection of matter would be just that, an appearance.


I would be somewhat sympathetic to the extreme view you outline above, with some qualification though. I would say that there necessarily is existence, but that if no one was around to perceive it, then the world as we perceive it would not materialise as it does.


With regard to the ideal point of science, I have on occasion wondered, if matter is created by mind, then are we simply exploring our own mental perception of the world? Would the collapse of the quantum wave function simply refer to our sensory perception (as we perceive it); in the way that light entering our retina is in the form of a wave and it then collapses to give our perception of the world - that I think might be a step too far.

[roosh]

Originally Posted by Joe1919

There is an argument that although it cannot be proven that 'substance' exists, nevertheless, we have no choice (if we want to live) but to interact with the world in some way. i.e. There exists an 'animal faith' or 'animal spirit' that is stronger than reason and is perhaps driven by feeling and intuition. I will give you some quotes.

'I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. .....Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy.' (David Hume Treatise...)

'The hungry dog must believe that the bone before him is a substance, not an essence; and when he is snapping at it or gnawing it, that belief rises into conviction, and he would be a very dishonest dog if, at that moment, he denied it. For me, too, while I am alive, it would be dishonest to deny the belief in substance; and not merely dishonest, but foolish: because if I am observant, observation will bring me strong corroborative evidence for that belief.'(Santayana, Scepticism and animal faith)

Husserl states that Realism is the natural attitude to take towards the world. We are 'conscious of a world endless spread out over space. [...] Corporal physical things are simply there for me. ( Ideas Part 2). But we can also see the world from an ideal point of view and bracket out any idea of existence etc. (This was the philosophical view that he took in his later years).

PS Stating that Realism is the 'natual attitude' does not necessarly imply that it is the 'true' or indeed always the most useful, as for example, the case where it is the 'natural attitude' to consider that the sun goes around the stationary earth.

I don't think we need to deny the existence of the material world, that we experience it is beyond question; the nature of its existence is open for question, however. That the physical world is a projection, often labeled "mind", is something which follows from a materialistic perspective - assuming science as the method of investigation.

IIRC, Idealism doesn't reject the existence of the [experience of a] physical world as a necessity; it just follows that the physical world is a mental projection (assuming the existence of mind - not necessarily "the mind").

[18AD]

Originally Posted by roosh

You might be right, it might perhaps be a little too far.

I think what can be said though, is that all matter, or at least our perception of it [which is all we know about matter] is a projection. That is, if there is a world "out there" then what we experience of it is a projection. But if we say that matter gives rise to the experience of what we label "mind" i.e. the projection of matter, we get caught in somewhat of a loop:

Matter causes the projection of matter, but the matter that causes that projection is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection and so on ad infinitum.

To get out of that loop you could assume that matter causes the projection, but I think that is to assume your conclusion. Alternatively, if mind does exist, and mind causes matter or rather, matter is just a perception of the mind, then there is no recurring loop. That matter appears to give rise to the projection of matter would be just that, an appearance.

Are you assuming that the projection of the mind can give no direct knowledge of the external world? What is known in the mind is only about the mind? So you can only know about your projections. Because without that assumption you can certainly posit that there is matter without entering a loop.

Also, if you are making the previous assumption your notion of cause and effect is equally assuming its conclusion because cause and effect is an idea about how the world works. Unless you're willing to say that mental projections are inherently self-causing.

At least I think so at first glance.

I would be somewhat sympathetic to the extreme view you outline above, with some qualification though. I would say that there necessarily is existence, but that if no one was around to perceive it, then the world as we perceive it would not materialise as it does.

This is a very interesting position. Merleau-Ponty takes the line that everyone actually inhabits a different world based on their ability to interact with it. So a rock face actually appears differently to a rock climber and to an average Joe.

In the same manner, the world of a bird is different to the world of a human. For a bird, trees actually present themselves as "livable" and "home" etc... Whereas to us they actually appear as "greenery" or as "climbable".

To that extent, the one tree is simply an intersubjective pre-conscious agreement.

With regard to the ideal point of science, I have on occasion wondered, if matter is created by mind, then are we simply exploring our own mental perception of the world? Would the collapse of the quantum wave function simply refer to our sensory perception (as we perceive it); in the way that light entering our retina is in the form of a wave and it then collapses to give our perception of the world - that I think might be a step too far.

This I find equally as problematic as hard materialism. It's just the flip side to "everything is matter" and I think brings with it similar problems.

However, it is interesting to note that our understanding of the world around us is tied in directly with our self-understanding. You could take the route that all understanding is self-understanding. The purpose of understanding anything can never be meaningful if it is the removed objective view.

[roosh]

Originally Posted by 18AD

Are you assuming that the projection of the mind can give no direct knowledge of the external world? What is known in the mind is only about the mind? So you can only know about your projections. Because without that assumption you can certainly posit that there is matter without entering a loop.

I didn't intend to, but there may be a nested assumption there I'm not aware of.

I would say though, that it is trying to follow on from a strict materialist position where mind is deemed not to exist.

Being made aware of the possibility though I would say that there isn't an assumption either way; there isn't an assumption that the projection is a direct representation of an external world (if one exists) and there isn't an assumption that it isn't. Relying on either assumption would, I think, be assuming the conclusion.

I think, although I might be wrong, without assuming one way or the other, the loop arises.

Originally Posted by 18AD

Also, if you are making the previous assumption your notion of cause and effect is equally assuming its conclusion because cause and effect is an idea about how the world works. Unless you're willing to say that mental projections are inherently self-causing.

At least I think so at first glance.

I haven't really followed the consequences of this to their logical conclusion, and this is very much an exploratory discussion, but I would say firstly that the initial assumption isn't being made.

However, with regard to cause and effect, their distinction as being separate is, I would say, is an erroneous belief, because cause and effect cannot be separated. I'm not even sure if that is a valid response to your point - I'm kind of hoping that your response will paint the next dot of where to go with the discussion (assuming there is even one to be had).

Originally Posted by 18AD

This is a very interesting position. Merleau-Ponty takes the line that everyone actually inhabits a different world based on their ability to interact with it. So a rock face actually appears differently to a rock climber and to an average Joe.

In the same manner, the world of a bird is different to the world of a human. For a bird, trees actually present themselves as "livable" and "home" etc... Whereas to us they actually appear as "greenery" or as "climbable".

To that extent, the one tree is simply an intersubjective pre-conscious agreement.

I would be inclined to go a bit further and say that without anyone to perceive it, there is no rockface, at least, as we, or even the rock climber perceives it. It might be a bit like trying to imagine what an uncollapsed quantum wave looks like.

Originally Posted by 18AD

This I find equally as problematic as hard materialism. It's just the flip side to "everything is matter" and I think brings with it similar problems.

Would the law of the excluded middle apply, in that it is either correct or it isn't; just as is the case for strict materialism - I'm not sure if they are the diametric opposites of one another, are they? If they were would it lead to the conclusion that either one or the other is true? They're probably not though, bcos they rely on concepts which can be interpreted differently.

Originally Posted by 18AD

However, it is interesting to note that our understanding of the world around us is tied in directly with our self-understanding. You could take the route that all understanding is self-understanding. The purpose of understanding anything can never be meaningful if it is the removed objective view.

That sounds interesting.

The definition of objective, more accurately, subjective could be contentious though, in the sense of who or what is the subject who experiences; and does what we think the subject is, actually exist?

[18AD]

Just some other thoughts on this.

Does the idea of a projection not require that you have something onto which you need to project? Does it not also need a projector? Are they themselves included in the projection or are they beyond it? You don't have to say that what is beyond is matter or mind or anything, but merely that there is something more.

Just to return to the phenomenological point of view briefly. Its starting point is that you simply need to look at how things appear. Husserl thought you could just look at the appearances without assuming that they are projections or matter or any other assumption. You could just describe how they appear.

Originally Posted by roosh

I didn't intend to, but there may be a nested assumption there I'm not aware of.

I would say though, that it is trying to follow on from a strict materialist position where mind is deemed not to exist.

Being made aware of the possibility though I would say that there isn't an assumption either way; there isn't an assumption that the projection is a direct representation of an external world (if one exists) and there isn't an assumption that it isn't. Relying on either assumption would, I think, be assuming the conclusion.

I may not have been clear on this. But can the projection give any knowledge about what is beyond it? You don't have to assume the projection is representative of external world or not, you can come to know it through examining the projection.

However, with regard to cause and effect, their distinction as being separate is, I would say, is an erroneous belief, because cause and effect cannot be separated. I'm not even sure if that is a valid response to your point - I'm kind of hoping that your response will paint the next dot of where to go with the discussion (assuming there is even one to be had).

I was pointing more towards your saying that matter causes the projection. Not only is the matter an assumption, but also that it causes. If matter is an assumption, so is everything you thinkn it does.

I guess you could just transfer cause and effect to mental projections.

I would be inclined to go a bit further and say that without anyone to perceive it, there is no rockface, at least, as we, or even the rock climber perceives it. It might be a bit like trying to imagine what an uncollapsed quantum wave looks like.

That is exactly the conclusion that is drawn. I find it quite compelling.
This also means that there is no meaningful way to talk about an objective rockface. That sort of objectivity traditionally being the aim of science.

Would the law of the excluded middle apply, in that it is either correct or it isn't; just as is the case for strict materialism - I'm not sure if they are the diametric opposites of one another, are they? If they were would it lead to the conclusion that either one or the other is true? They're probably not though, bcos they rely on concepts which can be interpreted differently.

I don't think the two positions are opposites. They simply seem to be two polar universalised accounts of the universe. If it's not all just matter, then maybe it's all just mind. Of course each has it's own distinct problems.

The definition of objective, more accurately, subjective could be contentious though, in the sense of who or what is the subject who experiences; and does what we think the subject is, actually exist?

What I meant by objective here is the traditional view of "being without subject." The subjective is seen as flawed and the objective accurate. But the objective is impossible. As I mentioned earlier, it is also undesirable, as it's meaningless.

As to whether the subject exists, I would certainly consider first-person subjective experience to be the minimum of what a subject might be.

[AmeliaO]

I've just done an essay on Physicalism and Consciousness - and I was discussing the problems of the thought experiments of Mary's Room and the idea of Philosophical Zombies and whether they're successful in discrediting the physicalist accounts of consciousness, and sadly, as someone who would have been a great believer in Physicalism, the thought- experiments actually do crush the two above theories.

[18AD]

Originally Posted by AmeliaO

I've just done an essay on Physicalism and Consciousness - and I was discussing the problems of the thought experiments of Mary's Room and the idea of Philosophical Zombies and whether they're successful in discrediting the physicalist accounts of consciousness, and sadly, as someone who would have been a great believer in Physicalism, the thought- experiments actually do crush the two above theories.

If you don't mind, how do they succeed in refuting physicalism?

Is Mary's Room the colour scientist example?

[take everything]

Hi lads
Not sure how relevant this is to the mind/matter thing, but emergence might be of interest.
It's something that intrigued me the last time i read about it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism
Although, that does say that it's compatible with physicalism so not sure if it's completely relevant to this debate.

[MisterEpicurus]

To suggest a difference between mind and matter, you'd have to show that one is NOT linked to the other directly. Why's that? Because if mind was independent of matter then out material brains would have no say in such situations.

However, given that our brains are always completely linked with a 'mind' process, then it rules out any suggestion that our minds are somehow special or independent of matter.

If I damage Broca's Area of the brain, I lose my language capabilities.

If I damage my frontal lobe and cerebellum, I damage my motor coordination skills.

You can see a direct link between what we think and hence our mind and how the physical process originates.

In every situation, the cause of the action of the mind is linked to a cognitive neural process. If mind was non-material, then why would it be influenced by the total physical nature of the brain, which it is.

Thus, our perceived sense of 'mind' or any linked process is really a function of the organization of matter and nothing else. Unless one can prove that this link can be broken at any stage, then we really shouldn't believe anything to the contrary.

[Priori]

Originally Posted by roosh

The proposition
That we* experience a physical world is not in question; it is pretty self-evident.

I would adjust this slightly to say that what we experience is a world, not necessarily a physical world. This gives to much initial leeway to physicalism, assuming the aim is to remain neutral (at the premise stage at least) between mind and matter.

Originally Posted by roosh

Science
Without making any assumptions about the nature of reality, if we simply follow the scientific method we deduce that the processes of the brain (physical matter) are what gives rise to our mental experiences.

I would say that if we follow the scientific method we merely observe that mental states are correlated with brain states. That the former arises from the latter commits too soon to a kind of emergence, in my opinion.

Originally Posted by roosh

We also deduce that what we experience as the physical world around us, including our own bodies, is a mental projection of sensory stimuli.

I would say mental representation, not mental projection.

Originally Posted by roosh

Side by side, these are two, seemingly, contradictory statements:

• matter gives rise to mind i.e. the mind is what the brain does

• the mind gives rise to matter i.e. matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection of sensory stimuli

You might have ended up with:

• Mental states/experiential events thus far studied by science have been accompanied by processes in the brain.
• These experiential events seem to be interpretations/representations of sensory stimuli.

Note these conclusions are not contradictory, and they also do not commit to the ultimate nature of reality - whether it be physical/mental/something else entirely.

The first conclusion does not claim that there are no experiential events/mental states without brain activity. In other words, it does not claim that to have experience at all, a conscious being/thing (or simply, a "consciousness") must have a brain as we understand it.

The second conclusion only indicates that reality as perceived may not be in fact what it appears to be. But neither does it claim that reality is not what it appears to be. It could well be (or could well be a part of it).

Personally, I incline towards a neutral monistic viewpoint, with matter and mind as we understand them being 'aspects' of something more fundamental.

[Priori]

Originally Posted by MisterEpicurus

To suggest a difference between mind and matter, you'd have to show that one is NOT linked to the other directly.

Directly linkage doesn't imply identity. You have to assume the difference yourself before any idea of linking the two concepts becomes intelligible.

A response might be: but that's it, they're just different concepts, two different ways of describing the same reality.

Reductive materialists like Churchland might default to something like this, failing to acknowledge that their response doesn't deal with the fact that the concepts have entirely different content - they do not describe the same content at all.

Originally Posted by MisterEpicurus

if mind was independent of matter then out material brains would have no say in such situations

This doesn't logically follow. If A is independent of B, it doesn't necessarily mean that B cannot have any impact on A.

To take a facetious example, you can be independent of your parents, but they might still have a big "say" in things...